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One Hundred Miles of Lives: 
The Stasi files as a People's History of East Germany 
 
 
There is a wonderful cartoon of the legendary Andy Capp, in which his wife puts her hand over 
the telephone receiver and says to him - as he stands glaring at her - 'it's not gossip...it's oral 
history.'  Particularly in the last two decades, oral history has generated a great deal of talk about 
"people's history" or history from below, history, not as it is seen through the lives of royalty and 
the signing of great treatises, but rather as it is lived and experienced by ordinary folk. If we 
knew more about the fabric of the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Smith, it is argued, we might increase 
our ability to discern the underlying meaning of a particular historical event, or even era.  A 
guiding assumption about "people's history" is that it empowers "the people" simply because they 
are at the center of it.  
 
However, an examination of one particular case, that of the East German secret police, reveals 
that there must be more to a people's history than mere documentation of "ordinary" people's 
lives, if it is to achieve its purported function.  The Ministerium fur Staatsicherheit - the "MfS" or 
"Stasi" - was designed to be the 'sword and shield of the [Communist] Party' and as such, it 
closely monitored every aspect of society, weeding out "bad germs" in order to protect what was 
perceived to be the good of the whole. Operating on the premises of such a justification, the Stasi 
kept records on the lives of one quarter of its population of sixteen million .1  The Stasi had 
approximately 125,000 full-time employees, and an additional 100,000 informants .2  Of the 
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official, full-time employees, 1052 were "surveillance specialists" who tapped telephones,  2100 
steamed open letters, and 5000 followed suspects,3 thus earning their internal slogan "We are 
Everywhere." Since 1980, the size of the MfS had doubled, working towards its ultimate goal of 
'the perfection of an espionage network that would cover every citizen in the GDR'.4 The Stasi 
owned 2037 buildings, apartments and country houses, 652 in East Berlin alone.  In addition, 
they had twenty-four vacation spas as well as exclusive hospitals and sports facilities exclusively 
for MfS  employees.  They even had their own barbers and grocers.  The annual budget for the 
MfS was 3.6 billion marks, or approximately two billion dollars, calculated at its internal GDR 
value.5 
 
It is not at all surprising that with the changes of 1989, the Stasi, with its history of flagrant abuse 
of civil rights, served as a focal point for the citizens' movement seeking to dismantle the 
remnants of the old system.  On December 4, 1989, exactly one month after the critical 
demonstration of over half a million people in Alexanderplatz, East Berlin, protesters occupied 
the Stasi offices in Leipzig.  On January 15, the East Berlin Stasi headquarters were ransacked.  
During the months which followed, there were various occupations of the MfS offices, with 
demonstrators demanding to see their files.  Finally in November 1991, two years after the wall 
had been opened, the government of a now unified Germany passed legislation allowing persons 
access to their files, but leaving the original commission which had been set up to supervise the 
files to decide on any publication of records.  An estimated 20% of the files were destroyed 
during the upheavals, including all of the MfS computer files, but what remains is one hundred 
miles worth of material.6  Interestingly, though, these papers, however meticulous and thorough 
they may be (and all indications are that they are both), somehow fail to communicate the 
essence of the lives they describe. 
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I moved to Berlin in February 1992, one month after the files had officially been opened.  I was 
there researching the psychological impact of acute social change on political actors.  In the 
course of the following six months, I conducted in-depth interviews with forty women and men, 
all of whom had been involved with the "bloodless revolution" of Autumn '89.  Most of the 
respondents had been leaders in the (underground) citizens' movement for a long time, others 
were involved in the arts and had helped to organize the November 4 demonstration, some were 
affiliated with the church  (a critical player in negotiations between the citizens' groups and the 
state), and some were lifetime members of the Communist Party who had expressed their 
criticism of the state from within this powerful organization.  Two of the forty had been official 
employees of the Stasi who, at the time of our interviews, were forming an "insider's committee" 
as they called it, gathering together persons like themselves who had worked for the MfS, who 
wished to discuss and analyze the past.  The interviews were primarily in East Berlin, with about 
one-quarter of them taking place in Leipzig.  
 
I had not intended my research to focus on questions of the Stasi, but because of the timing of my 
data collection, it was virtually impossible not to explore this topic which was of such central 
importance to the people with whom I was speaking.  Most of the respondents had submitted 
applications to see their Stasi files, and indeed many had already viewed them. (Their  
applications had been given priority because of their history of resistance against the state - an 
assurance for having a file.)  Thus it was that I had the opportunity to speak with people about 
what it felt like to read their files.7  Were the files accurate?  Could they indeed recognize their 
own lives as they had been documented, in some cases over many years?  All of the meetings, 
even those of a most private nature, noted?  Who said what to whom, what they wore, where they 
stood, how they moved?  Did they see themselves in these detailed accounts? 
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Irene Kukutz, one of the founders of Women for Peace (in the early 80s) and of New Forum (the 
largest of the opposition groups which mushroomed in Autumn '89), was one of the first East 
Germans to read her Stasi file.  Although it had been stipulated that files must be read only by 
individuals, on the second day that the files were open to the public, she and three other women 
disregarded this and insisted on viewing their files together.  She explains the reasoning behind 
their determination: 'We are all in the files together, and we are going to look at them together!'  
She describes her reaction to reading her file: 
it represents a kind of healing process, this ... hm, this fog and mysteriousness clears up 
and there lie the papers which, partially, are ridiculous, depressing but also ... hm, unreal. 
At last one sees it and can view it factually. 
Would you think that the files are really true? 
Not that one can say that they are untrue or forged, I mean in that sense of false. But of 
course they do not reflect our real lives. And that is reassuring  somehow. We were seen 
through their spectacles, we and the others. And through male spectacles for a start. At 
first they did not take us seriously, were always looking for the male in the background 
who manipulated us, because they thought that women were not capable of acting on their 
own. Well and later ... hm ... they took notice of us (laughs). 
 
Notably, Kukutz does not criticize the files on the grounds of the information they contain; their 
factual content is neither 'untrue' nor 'forged.' Nonetheless, she asserts that 'they do not reflect our 
real lives.'  The explanatory lens which her observers use to make sense of her actions is so 
fundamentally different from her own, she does not see herself in the descriptions she reads.  For 
Kukutz, this is reassuring, in some sense she is less invaded, because the web of meaning which 
underlies her behavior has gone undetected.  Interestingly, because the Stasi was so certain that 
Women for Peace was a tool of some male political activist(s), the group was allowed to operate, 
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virtually unimpaired by the state, for much longer than would otherwise have been the case.  
Meanwhile, the MfS pursued a red herring, a victim of its own narrow-mindedness, searching for 
what it was certain existed, but which did not: the men behind the scenes, plotting and 
controlling the actions of this women's group. 
 
Others who have read their Stasi files report similar reactions to that of Kukutz.  Frederic Pryor 
was a doctoral student at Yale University who was living in West Berlin between 1959 and 1961, 
writing his dissertation on the foreign trade system of the Soviet bloc system.  He ended up 
spending half a year in the Stasi Investigation Prison Hohenschonhausen on suspicion of 
espionage.  When he applied to see his Stasi file, he learned that they had accumulated 5,000 
pages of material on him.  He describes what he saw: 
 The Stasi was preparing a legal document to be used against me at a trial, and the 
reports did not indulge in a great deal of speculation or hysterical accusations.  
Rather, most of these materials were factual and sober...8 
Pryor's cell mate throughout his stay at the prison worked for the Stasi, and he alone submitted 
more than 350 pages of handwritten reports.  Pryor explains that however impressive these 
reports were in terms of detail, they were nonetheless lacking in insight.   
 ... my cell mate latched onto the idea that I was collecting information for the 
preparation of a foreign trade blockade of the GDR ... a perfect example of crack-
pot realism.  Once he had this "insight", he tried to fit everything into its 
framework.9 
Thus his experience of reading his file was in important ways similar to that of Kukutz.  Pryor 
writes "this was a prison run by bureaucrats, not philosophers"10; while they were very capable at 
recording the minutiae of his life, they failed to discern the deeper structure of meaning which 
held it all together.  
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I listen to the feelings expressed by Kukutz and Pryor with particular interest, asking myself how 
many times oral historians are guilty of the personal tresspassing she describes.  Moreover, how 
many of the people who we interview would recognize themselves in the detailed accounts we 
write about their lives and the contexts in which they live them?  How often do we misperceive 
the web of meaning which underlies the words and actions we so studiously record?  While there 
are many clear distinctions between the work of an oral historian and that of a Stasi informant, 
the potential similarities are rather disturbing.  It is this uncomfortable grey area which we shall 
examine more thoroughly here.  
   
Reinhard Weisshuhn was also one of the first people allowed to look at his file.  He had been 
involved with the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, one of the key human rights 
organizations in East Germany, since its inception in 1985.  This group, which necessarily 
operated underground, consisted of twenty members, ten of which it subsequently emerged were 
Stasi informers.  In our interview, I ask him why this group was considered to be such  a threat, 
as it was so small and so thoroughly infiltrated.  'No, it is the other way round' he explains. 
'Because the state felt threatened, it did everything possible to get so many informers into this 
group.'  Weisshuhn himself had been accused of collaborating with the Stasi. 'I wanted to clear 
my name, that's why I applied for this check up.  And then I was invited, almost as one of the 
first, to inspect the files.'  There was no evidence in his files to support the accusation, and 
Weisshuhn explains 'It was a rumor, no more.  A rumor spread by the Stasi themselves. It was 
very typical. Yes, even still in 1990.'  
 
Weisshuhn's story reveals an inherent trust in the veracity of the files. Surely no one knows better 
than he himself whether he did or did not collaborate with the secret police.  By applying to see 
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his file in order to clear his name, he is implicitly putting great stock by what is contained in the 
file itself.  Weisshuhn comments on the truthfulness of the files.  
Are there wrong accusations in these files? Did what they say you did correspond with what you 
knew you did? 
 'I don't know of anybody whose files lie. The authors now lie, still now.  They 
contradict the files.... The files are more honest than their authors. Now.'   
When Weisshuhn punctuates the end of his thought with the word 'now,' he draws a distinction 
between the past and present actions of the authors of the files.  When the authors were acting in 
their capacity as authors, that is to say when they were actually writing the files, their 
documentation was reliable; now other circumstances prevail, and the authors fabricate stories 
about the lives of those whom they observed.11  This claim makes sense when  one considers the 
timing of events.  Despite the disbanding of the MfS, former employees of that organization 
continue to function as an active, if covert and not unified, force in the society.12  After the 
dissolution of East Germany, many of them may well have perpetrated rumors which they knew 
to have no basis; the vindictive motivation of such behavior would have been to thrust the society 
into deeper chaos, and to try to sully the reputation of long-standing foes.  However, at the time 
that informers were compiling their reports, there would have been no motivation for them to 
falsify information which was written exclusively for their own organization.  Thus it is that 
although 20% of the files were destroyed during the transitional months, there have been virtually 
no reports of falsification; either they were destroyed or they were left unaltered.13 
 
Jorg Seidel was an official employee of the MfS14 (he does not the term "Stasi").  Indeed, he 
believes that most citizens of the GDR never knew of the existence of the MfS, and that therefore 
the term Stasi 'was not so much in use because most people didn't have any contact with [it].' As 
evidence of this claim, which he repeats several times in our interview, he offers the example that 
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'in the media and in the press, and in [popular] films, the subject of the C.I.A. was stirred so 
frequently... but [there was] no mention of the activities of the MfS.' (He never seems to  
consider that there might be alternative explanations for this fact.)  His observation contrasts with 
most empirical work on the subject, including my own.  Wolle comments on the 'poison of 
universal fear and mutual distrust' created by the Stasi, explaining that while 'nobody really knew 
for sure how far the Stasi's tentacles reached' this only increased, rather than diminished, the 
effect it had on the shaping of their lives. During the course of my data collection, I heard many 
stories which provided evidence of this.  On one occasion, my interpreter in Leipzig,  a house 
squatter in her early twenties, indicated to me, while we were bicycling through the streets of 
Leipzig, exactly where Stasi 'hidden cameras' had been located.  She told me that when she and 
her friends used to ride by these places they would wave to the cameras.  'Whether you were 
cowardly or courageous, the Stasi was always in the back of your mind' Wolle writes.  These 
fears were not unfounded; 'the reality which was gradually uncovered when the system ended 
exceeded even the most outrageous rumours and wildest imaginings.'15   
 
Thus my reaction to hearing Seidel's claim that the East German population had been generally 
ignorant about the existence of the Stasi was to question his capabilities as a perceptive observer 
of others around him. And yet, this was his very specialization. Seidel's specific responsibility 
was to spy on the American spies in East Germany. I ask him to describe the responsibilities of 
his job, and he responds:   
 I had to know all the details of the life of the CIA man, including the most intimate 
sphere.  I had to know this by heart, like my second life.  ... I had to know their biography. 
And I had also to know their psychological attitudes so I could know how would they 
behave, how would they act, how would they think.   
I was sensitive to the difficulties of trying to understand someone whose language I did not 
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speak, for that precisely described the situation I found myself in.16  I knew from our interview 
together that Seidel had virtually no familiarity with the English language.  I was finding it hard 
enough to communicate with others, even through a translator, and I did not have the added 
challenge of the demand for secrecy.  I asked him how he overcame this obstacle, to which he 
responded: 'The advantage was that my American colleagues spoke excellent German.'  I found 
this a curious comment; whereas my own difficulties in communication would have been largely 
ameliorated by such a condition, I could not see how this would substantially help him.  Seidel 
had no direct contact with he person whose life he was meant to document - and crucially, the 
C.I.A. agent had no interest in making himself understood to Seidel, a vital consideration for 
effective communication -  so under what circumstances could his command of German have 
been of assistance to Seidel?    
 
Seidel's evident commitment to the utility of positivist methods for conducting case studies is 
striking to a social scientist such as myself.  He seems to believe that by merely observing the 
external behavior of his American counterpart, he will be able to discern the deeper recesses of 
human personality.  One would imagine that this would be particularly challenging as he cannot 
understand the native language of the person whom he is meant to observe.  (Presumably key 
communications of the CIA agent were conducted in English.)  Seidel's attempt to derive 
inferences about thought processes by relying exclusively upon the observation of external 
behavior inverts the Weberian concept of verstehen, or "interpretative understanding," which lies 
at the root of much life history research.  According to this framework, social scientists should 
try to put themselves into the position of others in order to discern what meaning they ascribe to 
their actions.  Seidel need not be a trained researcher - which he decidedly is not - to deduce that 
behavior observation is a rather limited method to use to uncover personality structure.  Its 
shortcomings are evident in stories such as the one told by Irene Kukutz earlier; although her 
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behavior had been accurately observed and documented, the observer had failed to perceive the 
meaning of the actions from her point of view, and consequently the quality of his work, as 
measured by its efficiency in achieving its own intended purpose, had suffered. 
 
Seidel had to know more than the mere biography of 'the C.I.A. man'; he had to know 'how 
would they behave, how would they act, how would they think.'  This comment raises important 
questions for life historians. To what extent is it ever possible to discern the psychological 
attitudes of a person who one does not really know, and in some cases will never even meet?  
Exactly what criterion are necessary to be able to depict a life which is not one's own? Of course 
Seidel's work was very different from that of most of the informal collaborators, in that the latter 
group did indeed have the opportunity to speak, often at great length, to the person whom they 
were meant to be observing.  Thus, for instance, the ten Stasi collaborators in the Initiative for 
Peace and Human Rights, of which Weisshuhn was a member, had ample opportunity to speak 
with him on all sorts of issues. Presumably the reports they in turn wrote about those 
conversations were different in nature and quality to anything which Seidel could offer about a 
man with whom he had never so much as exchanged a word.  
 
There were, however, other situations in which MfS employees had the opportunity to speak 
directly with the person for whom they were responsible, and that person, in turn, was aware of 
the identity of the interviewer (i.e. an employee of the secret police). Such was the case in prison, 
where persons who offered resistance to state authority were often kept.  Werner Fischer was one 
of these people.  One of the leading activists of the underground citizens' movement, and also a 
member of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, after the changes of 1989, Fischer was the 
person designated to dissolve the Stasi.  People like Fischer, who were taken into custody 
regularly, had assigned to them special interrogators.  The way in which Fischer  describes his 
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relationship with the man he calls, with almost friendly overtones, 'my interrogator,' is intriguing. 
 Fischer tells of conversations he has had with him since the changes of 1989.  I ask him: 
When you said 'what did you do?' [after finishing his interrogations with Fischer and going 
home to his wife and family], what was his response?   
This provokes from Fischer a long rumination on the relationship as it had built up over time: 
 We had known each other from previous interrogations and a kind of relationship 
had developed between us.  You know how far this went... well, in a way I quite 
liked him.  In fact, they chose the interrogators for every opposition member very 
carefully.  They knew our profiles and to whom we would respond.  As I said, I 
almost liked him, a highly intelligent chap, very clever, with whom I could... I 
often told him 'you know under different circumstances I would love to have a 
pint with you.  
Indeed, since that time they have done so. They are not friends, but they are 'on familiar terms.'  
Fischer says that he was often brought in, in order to be detained from certain meetings, and on 
each of these occasions he spoke with his interrogator.  'When I asked him "tell me, this is 
nonsense, what are we going to talk about?" he would shrug his shoulders and reply "well, we 
have to once more."'  The regularity of these meetings produced, not surprisingly, a familiarity 
between the two men, but one which was nevertheless very unbalanced in terms of the things 
which they knew about each other.  It is in the same sequence of thoughts described above that 
Fischer tells me: 
 He knew everything about me, whilst I knew nothing about him.  I could assess him by 
his appearance, I would notice that he had been to the barber, or that he was married, he 
had a wedding ring, and he loved wearing a new tie every day.  So much so that, when I 
was in London17 I found myself browsing through Harrods' tie department and choosing a 
tie for him. 
 12 
The relationship between interrogator and interrogated, as described by Fischer, was 
characterized by a peculiar kind of understanding. Fischer used every observable detail about his 
interrogator to piece together information about him.  The interrogator, for his part, did not need 
to rely so heavily on such measures, as in their meetings, he was the one who held the power, the 
person who asked, not answered, the questions. This, combined with his access to Fischer's file, 
ensured that 'he knew everything about [him].'  Crucially, however, Fischer only participated in 
these meetings against his will; any comments he made would have been tailored for the ears of 
the security police.  Such an "interview" is thus most likely to produce heavily edited and - 
wherever possible - falsified data. 
 
Thus far we have discussed three different kinds of stories, each to do with gathering information 
about another person's life.  Irene Kukutz and Reinhard Weisshuhn describe situations in which 
they were being spied upon, both by persons who they knew and did not know.  For each of 
them, the information which they read in their files did not contradict their own perception of the 
facts.  However, at least Kukutz did not find her files convincing as a representation of the 
texture of her life, as she herself experienced it.  In the second kind of story, Jorg Seidel 
attempted to get information about another's life, in this case the C.I.A. spy located in East 
Germany, by merely watching him, and making psychological inferences from his observable 
behavior.  Finally, the third kind of story involved no spying, but rather a series of involuntary 
interrogations. 
 
How do these stories compare with more standard procedures for the gathering of life stories?  
The only fundamental similarity between them is an obvious one: the Stasi employees and 
collaborators share with other life history researchers an interest in detailed information about a 
particular individual, in order to construct a composite picture of that person's life.  The Stasi's 
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multifarious ways of gathering information about individuals' lives (opening mail, wire-tapping 
homes and telephones, and the already-described behavior observations) can, in a perverse light, 
be regarded as evidence of triangulated data, much in the way that other life historians utilize 
multiple sources of information to evaluate material.18   The triangulation of data, however, 
guarantees neither the quality nor the ethical grounding of the data.  There are at least two critical 
differences between the scenarios described here and standard use of life history method. First, 
there is absolutely no concern whatsoever with the rights of the person whose life is being 
recorded.  This lack of consent is important not only for ethical reasons, but also as a factor to be 
considered when evaluating the quality of the data.  Second, the MfS was not a research institute, 
at least not in any conventional sense of the term.  The purpose of data collection was very 
specifically tied to the interests of the state, and this informed every aspect of the work.  Thus, 
what  might in other circumstances be constructed as compromise in the research design could be 
justified if it furthered this end. 
 
There is another way in which the Stasi files differ from more standard life histories.  Whereas a 
good life history is written in such a way as to engage the reader, to communicate as effectively 
as possible not only the facts but also the texture of the subject's life, the very opposite is true 
with the personal dossiers of the MfS.  Wolle comments on the 'poverty of language, the 
formulaic word choice, the preference for abbreviations and low level of reflection' which 
characterize the files.  He explains that 
 All authors of reports were told to avoid any expression of opinion.  They were only to 
report the facts as concisely as possible... Even reports intended to describe a general 
atmosphere were frequently more stiff accounts of unconnected individual facts to which 
the author accorded neither weight nor meaning.  The system of total  surveillance began 
at this level to perpetuate itself  ad absurdum.19 
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The effect of this was not only that the files were, by all accounts, staggeringly lacking in 
anything resembling style.20  This ultimate de-personalization of both the observed and the 
observer in an area which is quintessentially personal - the documenting of people's lives - meant 
that by definition the reports could not serve the function for which they had been created.  
Human lives are, after all, composed of more than a series of facts.  It is this that the Stasi, for all 
of its attention to the minutia of daily life, failed to comprehend, and it is for this reason that 
people like Irene Kukutz fail to recognize themselves in the accounts of their lives which they 
read in their Stasi file, however accurate the information contained therein may be. 
 
Life history research, when conducted for the purpose of securing state control over the lives of 
its citizens, is not only morally reprehensible; it makes for bad research.  The reason is simple.  
Such "research" is guided by the premise that there is a very limited range of acceptable ways in 
which people live their lives.  Jorg Seidel believes that one of the key questions of his job was 
'for whom am I doing this work?'  He is right about this; as any researcher knows, considerations 
of who is sponsoring a project and why they are sponsoring it must always be taken into account 
when deliberating applying for grants.  In Seidel's case, the MfS, as the "sponsoring institution" 
as it were, occupied a commanding role not only in the collection of the data (specifying who 
should be observed and how) but crucially in its analysis (determining the meaning of what they 
documented). Thus Wolle comments that 'the intellectual narrowness [of the MfS reports] is 
shocking. Nevertheless, some of the details are interesting.'21  The MfS excelled in data 
collection, but its analysis was faulty. Employees and collaborators of the Stasi could not "see" 
what was before them, because it did not adhere to their expectations of what comprises a life.  
Just as the people who documented the activities of Women for Peace were blind to the reality 
which they confronted because it differed from what they thought they would find, so it is always 
true that unless a researcher is open to the unexpected, she will  greatly limit the potential of her 
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findings.  And so the Stasi employees and collaborators dutifully reported everything they saw 
and heard, but they were never able to capture the essence of the lives they observed. 
 
The stories which I heard in my months in East Germany provoked in me a wide range of 
thoughts and feelings: personal, political and professional.  Time and again I was forced to 
challenge aspects about myself and my professional identity.  How, I wondered, was I also 
complicit in distancing myself from difficult ethical issues?  When can we ever be confident with 
the presentations we offer of others' lives?  How can we successfully resolve the tension between 
understanding and moral judgment22  These are issues which are and will continue to be of 
ongoing concern, for they are central to the work of a good oral historian. 
 
Amongst the many questions which were this sensitive situation raised for me was, what role, if 
any, did real oral history play in the lives of East Germans?  Because the East German state had 
such a rigid formulation of what the lives of "the people" should consist of (both in terms of 
beliefs and behavior), the only institution which could conceivably be trusted with conducting 
life histories was that of 'the sword and the shield of the Party.'  That which was documented 
could never pose a threat to the state's conception of itself or of its population, because it was 
written within its own terms, processing every scenario through its own lens of meaning-making. 
 Thus the language of Marxism continued to be employed long after the practices of the state 
ceased to bear any relationship to the concepts of Marxism.  In Autumn 1989, when protesters 
rallied around the cry "We are the people," they were telling the authorities that they did not 
accept the official version of reality offered to them by the state; they did not believe that the 
state represented the interests of the people.  In taking to the streets, they were attempting to 
reclaim the authorship of their own lives. 
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In this context, it is understandable why the East German government would regard the practice 
of oral history as a threat to the state.  Lutz Niethammer comments that in East Germany, 'oral 
history was regarded by the party hierarchy as a subversive instrument to arouse the retarded 
mentality of the people against the conscience the established avant-garde.'23 Wolfgang Herzberg 
is generally regarded as the first oral historian in East Germany.  The tale of his journey to 
become an oral historian is woven throughout the interview.  First, he begins by describing the 
"long, long process" of distancing himself from his parents - Jews who had lost family in the 
Holocaust and who had returned to Germany to build a new country.   This distancing was, he 
says, "very painful."   
 
This is where the pain comes from? 
 
 ... I can pin it down to this, the other things are thousands of experiences. ... It has 
always been difficult for me to find my own subject...I had this desire.  I wanted to 
get to know reality... This was a constant drive within me, it was always there in 
my life, this will to get nearer reality and away from ideology.  This is why I came 
to oral history... Then I tried to write a dissertation. But I was not sure whether I 
was a scientist or an artist.  I did not have the courage to give my work a title... I 
went to a psychotherapist and said 'I must write this dissertation.' And he told me I 
should write small sections.  I said 'I can't.'  Because I always asked myself what 
happened in reality.  ... Then I tried to write another dissertation... I had great 
difficulties. I couldn't do it.  Again I went to see a psychotherapist.  'Help' I said, 
but he could not help.' 
 
Herzberg's words reveal a man struggling to uncover "reality" in  a society which views such a 
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pursuit as dangerous.  In order to 'get nearer reality and away from ideology' as he wished to do, 
Herzberg settled on listening to versions of reality as described by others - the work of oral 
history.  When others speak, 'it is like a banister I can hold on to.' How often do we oral 
historians use the words and thoughts of those who we listen to as a guide into our own thoughts, 
as a banister?  In Herzberg's case, the importance of this function was particularly heightened 
because of the repressive context within which it operated.  The "oral history" of the Stasi 
supplanted one reality (that of the actor) with another (that of the observer), whereas for 
Herzberg, oral history was a vehicle which allowed him to explore and document not only the 
external world, but his relationship to it.  
 
The second dissertation which Herzberg refers to in the passage cited above was the first project 
of its kind in the GDR: twenty-five in-depth interviews with workers in an electric-bulb factory, 
resulting in more than 3000 pages of transcriptions. Herzberg says that he 'enjoyed doing the 
interviews, but could not evaluate them scientifically.' He couldn't write 'because [he] asked 
[himself] what happened in reality' and the answers he heard, observed, and breathed were not 
the same as the reality described, and prescribed, by the state.  He says he did not have 'the 
courage' to give his work a name, for in so doing he would be identifying what he saw.  Being 
open to hearing, witnessing, experiencing a new reality is itself a political act.  It is 
understandable why Herzberg had difficulty finding a job.  His work was considered 'too risky, 
against ideology.' 
 
Throughout the interview, Herzberg speaks about his concept of history, and his aversion to 
ideology.  What does he mean by this term of "history" which peppers the rhetoric of state 
socialism?  'History is for me basically millions of life stories.  And I enjoy reading about social 
history. It is a means of avoiding an ideological approach to history.'  He describes his interest in 
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his work: 'to understand history ... where it comes from and where it goes.'  For Herzberg, the 
guiding motivation behind his work is 'to get to know reality.'  Herzberg takes the concept of "the 
people" very seriously; it is their stories which, when combined together in space and time, are 
the stuff of history.  
 
But the Stasi files - gathered in order to ensure 'an ideological approach to history' - do document 
the lives of millions.  Are they not one of the most extensive examples which exist of a real 
people's history?  The sheer quantity of material generated by the Stasi in the forty years of state 
socialism provides historians with a virtually unique opportunity to piece together the fabric of 
life of a whole society. For this reason, historians around the world pleaded that the files not be 
destroyed, claiming that they contained much of historical significance.  But although these files 
of the people were created by the people, their function was never to serve the interests of the 
people.  Moreover, the means used to gather the records was not only unethical but 
methodologically unsophisticated, if not flawed.  The Stasi files are not good life histories, 
precisely because they fail to capture the essence of the lives they record. Still, they are life 
histories, and the information contained in them is true. The one hundred miles of Stasi files, 
documenting, amongst other things, the lives of one-quarter of the East German population, is a 
people's history which was used with great effect to disempower the people. It is a people's 
history with neither conscience nor soul 
 19 
Notes 
   
1. John Feffer, Shock Waves: Eastern Europe After the Revolutions, South End Press, 1992, p. 82. 
 
2. Dirk Philipsen, We Were the People: Voices from East Germany's Revolutionary Autumn of 1989, Duke University 
Press, 1993, p. 10. 
 
3. Robert Darnton, Berlin Journal 1989-1990, W.W. Norton & Co., 1991, p. 125. 
 
4. Darnton, Berlin  Journal, p. 125. 
 
5. John Borneman, After the Wall: East Meets West in the New Berlin, Basic Books, 1991, p. 157. 
 
6. Feffer, Shock Waves, 1992, p. 82. Stefan Wolle, who has worked in the Archives of the MfS, has reported a similar 
figure.  The full extent of the files is estimated at 170 running kilometers (just over 105 miles), with 30 kilometers of that 
containing personal dossiers (See Stefan Wolle, "The Poisoned Society: the Stasi File Syndrome in the Former GDR" 
History Workshop, Issue 33, Spring 1992.)  The personal files, which have dominated media coverage of the Stasi, thus 
represent only a small portion of the existing material and are, Wolle asserts, "for the most part only of interest for 
research as examples" (p.141) 
 
7. I personally have never seen any Stasi files.  The law which was passed in November 1991 granted individuals the 
right of access to their own files, exclusively.  Thus, this essay is based on what interviewees have told me about their 
files, rather than any direct impression which I might have formed had I been able to read the material myself. 
 
8.Frederic L. Pryor "On Reading My Stasi Files" The National Interest Winter 1994/95, p. 75. 
9. Pryor, "On Reading My Stasi Files" p. 77. 
10. Pryor, "On Reading My Stasi File" p. 76. 
11. The point raised by Weisshuhn here has interesting implications for those comparing the relative reliability of oral 
and written testimony.  Stasi collaborators were for the most part unable to gain access to the files they had authored 
after the political tides had turned.  Thus, while the stories they tell have changed quite significantly in this time, their 
text has remained constant.   The written data, however, is not invulnerable: it was written by a particular person, in a 
particular environment, with a particular purpose and for a particular audience. 
12. In the course of my interviews, I heard several different accounts of ways in which civil rights' activists were still 
being harassed by former employees of the Stasi.  One such account related to a series of death threats received over the 
telephone.  Katja Havemann, long-term civil rights' activist and widow of Robert Havemann, symbol of East German 
opposition, explains the motivation behind such actions: "We are the living guilty conscience... They can't forgive us for 
what they did to us." 
  
 20 
  
 
13. This contrasts with the situation in some other Eastern bloc countries. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, the 
consequence of the comparatively more gradual take over of the offices of the StB, the security police, resulted in much 
more rampant falsification of files.  See Lawrence Weschler's "The Velvet Purge: The Trials of Jan Kavan" The New 
Yorker October 19, 1992, pp. 66-96. 
 
14. Seidel strongly rejects what he sees as the unjustified condemnation of the MfS, an organization whose work, he 
feels, has been severely distorted by the mass media. He describes the ideas which motivated him and his colleagues: 'I 
will say we are thinking of a human who is really in the center of the interests of the society... This means equal rights, 
equal opportunities for the development of everyone.'  Throughout the interview, he makes his feelings clear: 'I do not 
want to apologize for the activities of the MfS which have taken place.' 
 
15. Stefan Wolle, "The Poisoned Society", 1992, p. 139. 
 
16. See Molly Andrews, "A Monoglot Working Abroad: Working Through Problems of Translation" Oral History Vol 
23 No 2, Autumn 1995 for a discussion of the issues raised by the situation. 
17. As a result of his part in the Rosa Luxemburg demonstration in January 1988, Fischer was exiled from East 
Germany for six months. 
 
18. Wolle, too, implicitly compares the MfS to other institutional research settings.  He writes 'The lack of an empirical 
sociology in the GDR has often been lamented, but the Stasi engaged in just that' (p. 142). 
 
19. Stefan Wolle, "The Poisoned Society", 1992, p. 141. 
 
20. Pryor describes the Stasi as "a formidable bureaucracy that even had its own language; to allow me to understand 
what I read in my Stasi file, the specialist who handled my case gave me a list of over twenty pages of abbreviations 
used in the reports" (Pryor, "On Reading My Stasi Files" p. 75). 
21. Stefan Wolle, "The Poisoned Society", 1992, p. 143. 
 
22. For a very thoughtful discussion of this conflict, see Robert Jay Lifton The Nazi Doctors New York: Basic 
Books, 1986, p. 13. 
23. Lutz Niethammer, "Where Were You on 17 June?" in Luisa Passerini (ed.), Memory and totalitarianism, Oxford 
University Press, 1992, p. 69. 
